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 6 
DIVERSITY IN THE BOARDROOM: A 
CONTENT ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE 
PROXY DISCLOSURES 
Aaron A. Dhir* 
This Symposium, and its focus on “Comparative Sex Re-
gimes and Corporate Boards”, could not come at a more appro-
priate time. It explores a core location of power in the global 
marketplace: the corporate boardroom.1 It also considers the 
boardroom, through the lens of socio-demographic composition, 
as a site of contestation; as a place of identity formation, social 
closure, and social struggle. Internationally, in addition to in-
tra-firm and civil society-based initiatives, states and regula-
tors – dissatisfied with the existing homogenous landscape – 
have turned to formal ameliorative measures in an effort to fa-
cilitate diversification. Other jurisdictions, at the time of writ-
ing, are currently in the process of debating the efficacy and 
possible use of similar strategies. 
The quota-based path, originating in Norway, has now 
been replicated in varying forms elsewhere in Europe. It man-
dates certain levels of representation (exclusively vis-à-vis gen-
der) in the boardroom and can be seen as a form of command-
and-control regulation. The relationship between regulator and 
regulatee is hierarchical and predicated on a deterrence-based 
logic. A second path, however, pursued in corporate governance 
codes, principles, and guidelines – and in formal securities law 
– is a marked departure from the Norwegian positive discrimi-
nation model. Under the disclosure model, the state’s interven-
tion is less severe. Rather than dictating a predetermined out-
come that must be achieved, this path – which has taken on 
different forms – asks regulated entities to publicly report on 
diversity-related governance information. The U.S. diversity 
disclosure rule, enshrined in 2010 by the Securities and Ex-
                                                            
* Associate Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University; 2013-
14 Canadian Bicentennial Visiting Professor of Law, Yale Law School and 
Global Justice Senior Fellow, Yale MacMillan Center.   
1  “Boardroom – the word alone conjures up visions of power, wealth, and 
privilege. . .” JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: 
THE REALITY OF AMERICA’S CORPORATE BOARDS 1 (1989).   
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change Commission, illustrates this approach. It requires reg-
istrants to report the following information: 
“Describe … whether, and if so how, the nominating committee 
(or the board) considers diversity in identifying nominees for di-
rector. If the nominating committee (or the board) has a policy 
with regard to the consideration of diversity in identifying direc-
tor nominees, describe how this policy is implemented, as well as 
how the nominating committee (or the board) assesses the effec-
tiveness of its policy”.2 
Disclosure is best understood as a form of decentered, new 
governance regulation. Here, the state is no longer the nucleus 
of the regulatory space. Rather, it forms but one part of a plu-
ralistic regulatory encounter where the regulated entity and 
other non-state actors also contribute to the formulation of an 
overall normative ordering. In the first path, the regulation of 
corporate governance diversity takes place at the state’s be-
hest; in the second, it takes place more in the state’s shadow.3 
My work in this field has focused on both forms of regula-
tion. With regard to quotas, strikingly, the Norwegian law is 
not located in regulation that explicitly deals with human 
rights or equality issues; rather, it is found in the heart of the 
legal regime that gives life and personality to corporations – in 
Norwegian corporate law. I have conducted qualitative, inter-
view-based research with Norwegian corporate directors, both 
men and women. It is only through understanding how the 
goals of the law have translated into the day-to-day existence of 
these individuals that we can begin to consider the “big pic-
ture” questions that accompany the quota-based approach.  
With regard to disclosure, I have chosen to focus on the 
U.S. as a second case study for four principal reasons. First, 
similar to the Norwegian law, the site that houses the U.S. rule 
is noteworthy. Once again, it is not found in regulation that fo-
cuses on anti-discrimination etc…; rather, it is located in the 
heart of the legal regime that governs the public issuance of 
shares – in U.S. securities law. Second, and related to the first, 
the U.S. rule (like the Norwegian law) has been controversial, 
painted by some as an unjustified intervention into market ter-
                                                            
2 SEC, Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, Securities Act Release No. 33-
9089 115-116 (Dec. 16, 2009).   
3 The shadow metaphor was recently used to great effect in MARC T. 
MOORE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE SHADOW OF THE STATE (2013).   
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss1/2
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rain and as being in tension with the underlying purpose of se-
curities regulation. Third, quite simply, U.S. markets represent 
the biggest share of overall global market capitalization.4  
Fourth, I am mindful of the argument of scholars such as 
Schuck that there is something special – something unique – 
about the U.S.’s historical engagement with the idea of diversi-
ty.5 
My inquiry into the U.S. approach begins with an overview 
of its conceptual underpinnings. I then explore reactions to the 
rule and consider whether, in promulgating it, the SEC acted 
reasonably, or if it strayed significantly from its mandate. 
From there, I use a mixed-method, qualitative–quantitative 
content analysis to investigate the micro-dynamics of this ap-
proach. I take an initial temperature reading of corporate ar-
ticulations of diversity under the first years of the rule. These 
articulations are particularly fascinating given that the SEC 
does not provide firms with a definition of the term “diversity”.  
The specific results of my study are forthcoming.6 Overall, 
it establishes that the concept of diversity carries multiple con-
notations for U.S. corporations. However, perhaps its most sa-
lient finding is that, when left to their own devices (i.e. in the 
absence of regulatory guidance), firms most frequently think in 
experiential terms and focus on a director’s prior experience, or 
knowledge and skills — rather than in socio-demographic 
terms with an eye to gender or racial diversity. As I have re-
ported elsewhere, only approximately half of firms in my sam-
ple fell into the latter camp.7 
How are we to receive this finding? What are its broader 
                                                            
4 See the World Bank statistics compiled in, Top 20 Nations Listed by 
Stock Market Cap (In Billions), August 25, 2013, available at  
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/willbanks/2013/08/25/top-20-nations-listed-by-
company-market-cap/.  
5 As it relates to race and ethnicity. See PETER H. SHUCK, DIVERSITY IN 
AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A SAFE DISTANCE 14 (2003) (“The belief in 
the diversity ideal, then, appears to be a distinctively, if not uniquely, Ameri-
can (or at least North American) theme.”).   
6 In a book manuscript under contract with Cambridge University Press, 
provisionally titled Challenging Boardroom Homogeneity: Corporate Law, 
Governance and Diversity. Manuscript is on file with author. 
7 Aaron A. Dhir, Boardroom Diversity and Disclosure: A Nudge in the 
Right Direction?, THE TORONTO STAR, May 31, 2013, available at  
http://www.thestar.com/opinion/commentary/2013/05/31/boardroom_diversity
_and_disclosure_a_nudge_in_the_right_direction.html. 
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implications?  
For firms, related experience is an attractive criterion giv-
en that it may provide knowledge of industry nuances and 
competition, sources of strategic advantage, and a broader 
network. Industry expertise has also been linked to meaningful 
boosts in firm value.8 Further, while the literature is mixed, 
certain studies that find a positive relationship between firm 
value and board diversity more broadly suggest that experien-
tial diversity may result in a more robust positive financial 
outcome as compared with socio-demographic diversity.9 More-
over, and most significantly, unlike identity-based characteris-
tics, experience is a predictable, traditional variable that fits 
within most standard conceptions of what it means to be quali-
fied.  
That said, a key issue for many observers, including a 
number of large institutional investors, is whether the SEC 
rule will facilitate intra-organizational change and eventually 
have the effect of increasing levels of socio-demographic repre-
sentation on corporate boards. Indeed, my study notes that the 
representation of women and racial/ethnic minorities was the 
primary concern of those who responded to the SEC’s original 
request for comments on a potential diversity disclosure provi-
sion.  
In the future, when the rule has been in effect for a longer 
period of time, and a more voluminous data set exists, a com-
prehensive study on the causal or correlative relationship be-
tween the rule and diversity levels after its implementation 
will be of great assistance in evaluating the effectiveness of this 
strategy10 — as will a study of how the diversity discourses 
                                                            
8 Olubunmi Faleye, et al., Industry Expertise on Corporate Boards, July 
25, 2012, at 1, 36, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? ab-
stract_id=2117104; see also Wolfgang Drobetz, et al., Is Director Industry Ex-
perience a Corporate Governance Mechanism?, Aprtil 25, 2013, at 2, available 
at  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2256477. (“Our find-
ings confirm that boards with a higher fraction of directors with experience in 
the respective firm’s industry are associated with higher firm values”).   
9 Ronald C. Anderson et al., The Economics of Director Heterogeneity, 40 
FIN. MGMT. 5, 27 (2011); but see, in the Australian context, Stephen Gray & 
John Nowland, Professional Expertise and Board Diversity, Jan. 17, 2014, at 
24 available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2289689 
(“[o]verall, we find no relationship between professional expertise diversity 
and firm value”).   
10 Thomas Lee Hazen & Lissa Lamkin Broome, Board Diversity and 
Proxy Disclosure, 37 UNIV. OF DAYTON L. REV. 39, 73-74 (2011).   
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol26/iss1/2
10 PACE INT’L L. REV. SYMPOSIUM ED. [Vol.  26::1 
change with time. In the meantime, my study’s preliminary 
finding that, to date, social identity categories are overshad-
owed in the discourse serves as a caution that the intended re-
sult under new governance-style thinking may not be material-
izing. In other words, while the rule has achieved some 
laudable results, there is reason to be concerned that it is not 
living up to its full, anticipated potential.  
In my forthcoming work, I paint a picture of why that 
might be. I contend that the rule as currently formulated can 
be expected to produce meaningful change only if diversity is 
internalized as a social norm within corporate governance cul-
tures. Since, I argue, that has not yet occurred, the results of 
the content analysis can be expected to replicate themselves go-
ing forward. That said, drawing on the literature on law and 
norms, and the expressive function of law, I posit that the rule, 
if redesigned, has at least the potential to alter existing norms 
and therefore to possibly modify corporate behavior.  
In that vein, I hope that my work will deepen the interna-
tional policy conversation and inform the on-going global de-
bate. I am particularly mindful of, and interested in, the quick-
ly-evolving regulatory landscape in Canada. In many ways, 
Canada is a compelling site of inquiry. Canadian “bijuralism” – 
the existence and interaction of both common and civil law le-
gal cultures – is rooted in its historical colonization by Great 
Britain and France. But while Canadian political and legal cul-
tures are strongly influenced by these European countries, its 
proximity to the U.S. has had an immeasurable impact. As 
Trudeau once quipped: “[l]iving next to you is in some ways like 
sleeping with an elephant. No matter how friendly and even-
tempered the beast, if I can call it that, one is affected by every 
twitch and grunt.”11  
This sentiment holds especially true in relation to corpo-
rate governance. While the Canadian regime draws from both 
the English model and the norms of its neighbor to the South,12 
the latter’s influence cannot be understated, particularly in re-
cent years. A 2012 empirical study on the voluntary adoption of 
corporate governance practices strikingly found that “[w]hen 
                                                            
11 ARTHUR ANDREW, THE RISE AND FALL OF A MIDDLE POWER: CANADIAN 
DIPLOMACY FROM KING TO MULRONEY 97 (1993).   
12 Andrew MacDougall et al., Canada in THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REVIEW 34 (Willem J.L. Calkoen, ed. 2012).   
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given the choice, [Canadian] firms voluntarily adopt U.S. 
standards rather than Canadian guidelines, regardless of 
whether they are cross-listed.”13  
As it stands, the Canadian landscape exhibits the initial 
signs of both regulatory approaches discussed above.14 In Que-
bec, the only province whose legal system is rooted in the 
French civil law tradition, a quota law exists for state-owned 
enterprises. Effective December 2011, boards of these firms 
must consist of “an equal number of women and men”.15 Taking 
this philosophy one step further, a Liberal Party Senate bill, 
introduced by a senator from Quebec, seeks inter alia to re-
quire the boards of all federally incorporated corporations and 
various financial institutions to have at least forty percent rep-
resentation of both women and men.16 
On the other hand, the province of Ontario, described by 
one political scientist as “English Canada's political and cul-
tural hegemon”17 appears to be moving in a different direction. 
As part of its 2013 budget, Ontario’s Liberal government de-
clared its support for increased gender representation in gov-
ernance.18 It subsequently requested the Ontario Securities 
Commission to begin a process to consider a provincial “comply-
or-explain” diversity disclosure strategy.19 This resulted in a 
                                                            
13 Anita I. Anand et al., Domestic and International Influences on Firm-
Level Governance: Evidence from Canada, 14 AM. ECON. REV. 68, 107 (2012).   
14 See id. 
15 An Act Respecting the Governance of State-Owned Enterprises, R.S.Q. 
2014, c. C-43 (Can.).  
16 See An Act to modernize the composition of the boards of directors of 
certain corporations, financial institutions and parent Crown corporations, 
and in particular to ensure the balanced representation of women and men 
on those boards, 2011, 41st Parl., 1st Session, Bill [S-203] cl. 2 (Can.). This 
assumes a board of more than 8 members. For boards with 8 or fewer mem-
bers, the Bill stipulates, “the difference between the number of directors of 
each sex may not be greater than two.” Id. While this last iteration of the Bill 
did not become law, the Senator plans to reintroduce it in the Canadian Sen-
ate. 
17 Nelson Wiseman, In Search of Canadian Political Culture (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2007) at 8. 
18  CHARLES SOUSA, A PROSPEROUS & FAIR ONTARIO: 2013 ONTARIO 
BUDGET 291 (Queen’s Printer for Ontario, 2013), available at 
www.fin.gov.on.ca/en/budget/ontariobudgets/2013/papers_all.pdf.   
19 Women in Leadership, ONTARIO WOMEN’S DIRECTORATE, 
http://www.women.gov.on.ca/english/recognizing/index.shtml (last visited 
June 20, 2013).   
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consultation paper20 and a public roundtable in October 2013, 
intended to inform the regulator’s on-going deliberations.21 I 
am especially hopeful that my study’s insights will be of assis-
tance to Canadian policy-makers as they advance in navigating 
this complicated and controversial terrain, with the end goal of 
moving towards more inclusive governance architectures. It is 
a terrain where key social institutions and phenomena – busi-
ness corporations, legal governance, and diversity – are entan-
gled and are constantly forming and reforming one another in 
an on-going dialogue. 
 
                                                            
20 ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION, OSC STAFF CONSULTATION PAPER 58-­‐
401: DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS REGARDING WOMEN ON BOARDS AND IN SENIOR 
MANAGEMENT (2013), available at www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/ Securi-
ties-Category5/sn_20130730_58-401_disclosure-requirements-women.pdf.   
21 OSC Roundtable on Women on Boards, ONTARIO SECURITIES 
COMMISSION (Sept. 2013), https://www.osc.gov.on.ca/documents/en/Investors/ 
inv_news_20130930_roundtable-women-boards.pdf. I participated in this 
roundtable as an invited panelist. 
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